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Making a rather ambitious, broad-form decision, the Israeli Supreme Court 
(ISC) in 2009 ruled that privatization of prisons is a per se violation of human 
rights, in particular the rights to liberty and dignity.1  The Court ruled that it was 
not the often deleterious consequences of privatization that violated the rights to 
liberty and dignity, but that privatization of prisons by itself was a violation.2  This 
decision has been subject to much negative commentary and criticism3 with most 
analyses focusing on the Court’s argument on the right to liberty.  Scholars that 
have dismissed the opinion seemed to have misread it, often grounding their 
counter-arguments with faulty and wildly abstract premises that misrepresent the 
human rights issues at stake.  This article focuses on the Court’s novel argument 
on the right to human dignity, and especially how privatization of prisons turns 
inmates into commodities.  While this argument may have been under-developed 
 
1. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus. v. Minister of Fin., 63(ii) PD 545 [2009] (Isr.), English 
translation available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf 
[hereinafter Prison Case]. 
2. As per the Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Libety, SH No. 1391, § 8 (Isr.), English 
translation available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm [hereinafter 
Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty]. For an overview of the different problems 
associated with private prisons, see Uri Timor, Privatization of Prisons in Israel: Gains and Risks, 
39 ISRAEL L. REV. 81, 82-84 (2006) (noting in particular the problems of oversight over private 
prisons by governmental agencies, the fact that private prisons are not focused on rehabilitation 
of prisoners, and challenging the claim that private prisons are actually more efficient); Christine 
Bowditch & Ronald S. Everett, Private Prisons: Problems within the Solution, 4 JUST. Q. 441 
(1987) (explaining that efficiency factors are clouded when privatization occurs for the entire 
infrastructure, plus free market competition is well-nigh impossible for prisons); Rachel Christine 
Bailie Antonuccio, Prisons for profit: Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 
33 J. CORP. L. 577 (2008) (stating that while a non-delegation challenge would be difficult under 
constitutional standards, problems with private prisons given strive for profit margins and 
internal staff issues indicate that more regulation is required); Michael Brickner & Shakyra Diaz, 
Prisons for Profit: Incarceration for Sale, 38 HUM. RTS. 13 (2011) (stating that key problems with 
private prisons include profit maximizing, staffing issues, lack of accountability to state, and 
overall poor treatment of prisoners); CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE 
TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 17 (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be _True.pdf (noting dubious cost-
saving results and inadequate care overall). But cf. Malcom M. Feely, The Unconvincing Case 
Against Private Prisons, 89 IND. L. J. 1401, 1418 (2014) (asserting that the key argument against 
private prisons, i.e., the state as holding the monopoly for punishing its citizens given state 
sovereignty and the implied social contract, is misplaced since the state may delegate its powers 
to private entities); id. at 1426-28 (noting that privatization of prisons in Australia can be viewed 
as a successful venture); Kevin A. Wright, Strange Bedfellows? Reaffirming Rehabilitation and 
Prison Privatization, 49 J.  OFFENDER REHAB., 74, 74 (2010) (noting that empirical findings 
concerning private prisons and their affects are ambiguous and that “no clear pattern exists as 
to whether private prisons outperform public prisons”); Peter H. Kyle, Contracting for 
Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087 (2013) 
(asserting that instead of criticizing prison privatization, focus should lie on creating adequate 
performance-based measurements like reduced recidivism and increased employment as a means 
of ensuring a better private framework). 
3. See discussion infra Part II.  
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in the Court’s opinion, teasing out and expanding on the Court’s logic could provide 
an important new avenue to consider when litigating matters that pertain to the 
fundamental human right to dignity in other forums, both domestic and 
international. 
The Israeli Court decision briefly mentions that similar decisions have not been 
made in other forums and cited a brief that suggested that “were arguments of this 
kind to be raised before those courts, they would not be expected to be successful.”4  
This paper argues instead that the logic of the Israeli decision on the human rights 
to dignity could be successful in other jurisdictions, especially those that have 
strong case law on the rights of vulnerable populations and the right to human 
dignity, such as South Africa, the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, and the Inter-American Human Rights system.  Indeed, the viable 
contentions based on the human right to dignity that could be raised before the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights serve as potential grounds for 
challenging the widespread privatization of prisons in the United States.  
This paper begins with an analysis of the Israeli prison privatization case with a 
focus on the Court’s finding of a per se violation of the human right to dignity.  The 
second section analyzes two previous commentaries of the Israeli case to show how 
even those in agreement with the Court’s decision have misread the case.  This 
analysis provides a deeper and more nuanced reading of the Israeli Court’s logic on 
the human right to dignity, especially how the commodification of inmates in a 
private prison inherently is a violation of that right at least in the Israeli context.  
The third section expands upon the Court’s reasoning through a discussion of what 
has been referred to as “cauterization,”5 which involves branding a group as 
inferior, sealing it off from the social and political sphere, and reducing sympathy 
for its members. Interestingly, the same logic was also used in a recent 
groundbreaking mental health decision, Purohit and Moore v. Gambia,6 a case 
before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  The fourth section 
teases out the key elements of the Israeli decision to show which elements would 
need to be present to successfully bring such a case in other jurisdictions.  These 
elements are present not only in the Israeli context, but also in the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the South African Constitutional 
Court, and the Inter-American Human Rights system.  
 
4. Prison Case, supra note 1, at 60 (referring to an expert opinion authored by UK academic 
Professor J. Jowett and submitted by the Government, one of the defendants to the case). 
5. See WILLIAM PAUL SIMMONS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE MARGINALIZED OTHER 10-12 (2011). 
6. Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001, 11 Int’l Hum. Rights Rep. 257 (Afr. 
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2003), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions 
/33rd/comunications/241.01/achpr33_241_01_eng.pdf [hereinafter Purohit v. Gambia]. 
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I. The Israeli Case 
The Israeli Supreme Court, acting as the High Court of Justice, held in 2009 by 
an 8-1 margin that the Israeli law creating the country’s first privatized prison 
violated Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity,7 not because of the potential 
consequences of the privatization, but because privatization inherently violated the 
human dignity of prisoners.  
The Court’s opinion, crafted by (then) Supreme Court President Beinisch, has 
been subject to serious criticism by legal scholars, even by those who agree with 
the ultimate outcome.8  One central ground for rebuking criticism is to recognize 
the nuances offered in the opinion,9 most notably Judge Beinisch’s arguments 
against the commoditization of inmates through prison privatization.  As Judge 
Beinisch writes, “allowing a private concessionaire of a prison to make financial 
profits, disproportionately violates human rights and the principles required by the 
democratic nature of the regime.”10  It is the branding of prisoners as “means for 
the private corporation,” or the commodification of prisoners, that is at the heart of 
 
7.  The Basic Laws are meant to serve as the framework for an eventual written constitution; they 
are equivalent to any other law except that in some of the Basic Laws, an entrenchment provision 
requires a special majority vote by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) prior to any change. See David 
Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-revolution in Israeli Constitutional 
Law?, in  PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 144-45 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysbaltt  eds., 1996); Stephen 
Goldstein, Protection of Human Rights by Judges: the Israeli Experience, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 605, 
606 (1994). 
8.  The critics can be placed into two distinct groupings. The first group is comprised of those who 
assert that the court was inherently incorrect in deeming the matter a violation of human dignity 
since the focus should be on the state as an integrated actor in the market. See Alexander Volokh, 
Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2012) 
(arguing that the issue demands a proper empirical accounting of public and private entities) 
[hereinafter Volokh, Employee-Contractor Distinction]; Hila Shamir, Privatization: The State, the 
Market and What is Between Them – in Light of the Supreme Court Decision on Prison 
Privatization, 35  IYUNEI MISHPAT 747 (2013) (in Hebrew) (asserting that the state is inherently 
part of the market economy such that the state and market coexist); Daphne Barak-Erez, The 
Private Prison Controversy and the Privatization Continuum, 5 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 138 
(2011) (arguing that the Court properly considered human dignity issue, but did not address 
broader matters concerning privatization).  
 The second group of critics assert that human dignity is an issue, but the Court erred in its 
approach and reasoning. See Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli 
Supreme Court Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 I. CON. 690 (2010) (arguing that the 
preferred focus of the Court should have been on the division of governmental powers); Alon 
Harel, On the Limits of Privatization in Light of the Supreme Court Case on Prisons, 2 MISHPATIM 
ONLINE 1 (2010) (in Hebrew) (asserting that the issue of human dignity centers on the moral 
capacity to punish another person, aligning with Procaccia’s approach, discussed infra); M. Tamir 
& A. Harel, On Human Dignity and Privatization in Light of the Supreme Court on Prisons, 41 
MISHPATIM 663 (2012) (in Hebrew) (asserting that the focus of case should be on the human right 
to free will and choice capacities). 
9. That for some, at least, seem to be missed by these commentators. 
10. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 54, at 94. 
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the Court’s reasoning, and it tips the scale to a violation of human dignity.  Far 
from being an irrational stance, this logic also underpins Judge Beinisch’s previous 
ruling, when she held that corporal punishment is a per se violation of human 
dignity,11 and it is ultimately a strong ground for a potential submission before the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights when considering challenges to 
Arizona’s rampant prison privatization as a per se violation of the American 
Declaration of Human Rights.  
A. Factual Background of the Israeli Case 
Given a shortage of prison space in Israel, along with poor prison conditions and 
rising administrative costs, Israel decided to look into the matter of prison 
privatization in 2003.12  On March 24, 2004, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) 
passed an amendment to the Prison Law.13  The amendment provided the means 
for submitting private bids, the conditions that must be maintained in the prison, 
the scope of jurisdiction held by the private facility over the prisoners, and the 
scope of oversight to be maintained by the state over the private concern operating 
the prison.14  Choosing from three different privatization models,15 the Knesset 
favored the UK model of prison privatization by allowing the private company to 
ensure order and prevent escapes, yet limited its capacities to actually punish the 
prisoners.16  Thus, solitary confinement was to be limited to 48 hours at a time, 
and the prison guards were considered public employees.17  
After a tender was awarded to ALA Management and Operation Ltd. to build a 
 
11. See discussion infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
12. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶1, at 34. Justice Proccacia, in her concurrence, wrote that the main 
purpose of amendment 28, as derived from its legislative background and context, is “to promote 
the welfare of the prison inmate by reducing the serious overcrowding that currently exists in the 
prisons, improving the services provided in them and expanding the treatment and rehabilitation 
programmes available to the inmate.” Id. at 28. See also Amy Ludlow, Prison Privatization in 
Israel: Important Transnational Lessons, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 326, 326-27 (2010). 
13. Prisons Ordinance Law (Amendment No. 28), 5764-2004, SH No. 348 (Isr.) (in Hebrew). 
14. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶¶11-12, at 44-48. 
15. The French model only allows a private concern to provide specific logistical services like food or 
medical care, whereas the American model provides complete control to the private concern, 
including punishment capacity within the prison. The UK model gives the private concern broad 
administrative control over the prison, but any form of punishment is to be meted out by the 
state. See Shamir, supra note 8, at 756-57. Specifically,  
[The Israeli law] is a unique and experimental model, which constitutes a ‘pilot’ test that is 
expressly limited to one prison and includes mechanisms to protect the rights of the 
inmates and effective supervision and intervention mechanisms that are available to the 
state and will allow it, inter alia, to reverse the process at any stage and take back control 
of the prison because of a breach of the terms of the permit given to the concessionaire. 
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 5, at 38. 
16. Shamir, supra note 8, at 756-57 (noting that originally, the French model was favored).  
17. Id. 
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prison in the southern part of the country, a challenge was filed in 2005 by the 
Human Rights Division of the Academic Center of Law and Business in Ramat 
Gan against the Minister of Finance, Minister of Public Security, ALA 
Management and Operation Ltd., and the Israeli Parliament.18  During the time 
that it took the Court to actually issue its decision, ALA Management had 
completed building the private prison and was in the midst of hiring personnel to 
operate the facility.19  
The petitioners contended that privatization of prisons was an inherent 
violation of the prisoners’ rights to liberty and human dignity,20 that under the 
Basic Law: Government,21 the government cannot transfer its responsibilities to a 
private actor,22 and that private operators would be inclined to undermine 
prisoners’ rights by cutting corners and maintaining their profit margins.23  
B. Privatization as a Per Se Violation of Israeli Prisoners 
The Court held that privatization is a per se violation, and therefore it did not 
need to reach a judgment on the consequences of privatization, as a decision on the 
consequences would be based upon “a future violation of human rights and there is 
no certainty that this will occur.”24  Since the evidence is “ambiguous” as to 
whether the private prison would be more abusive of inmates than public 
facilities,25 the Court relied on the per se argument that privatization is a violation 
 
18. Prison Case, supra note 1, at 27. 
19. See Ludlow, supra note 12, at 327. 
20. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 2, at 36. 
21. Israeli Basic Law: the Government (Amendment No. 4), 5752-1992, SH No. 1124 of the 24th Elul, 
5744 (Sept. 21, 1984), at 220, English translation available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-
Archive/1960-1969/Pages/Basic%20 Law-%20The%20Government%20-1968-.aspx. 
22. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 3, at 37. The court dismissed this argument, noting that the clause 
regarding the prohibition of power delegation by the government is only recommended. Id. ¶ 63, 
at 100. Justice E.E. Levy, in his dissent, made a similar point, noting, “The state has not divested 
itself of its powers but merely exchanged them for supervisory powers. It is hard to see how this 
conflicts with the constitutional role of the government, and the mechanisms of indirect 
government should be examined on their merits.” Id. at 29. See also Medina, supra note 8, at 6 
(pointing out that: “In line with the prevailing view in other jurisdictions, prison privatization was 
assumed to meet the non-delegation challenge as long as a public body provides sufficiently 
detailed guidelines for running the prison, and applies effective supervisory powers.”). 
23. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 4, at 37. 
24. Id. ¶ 19, at 57. Interestingly, Justice Levy’s dissenting opinion also called for the law to be 
properly played out prior to making a decision on a violation of human dignity. Id. at 29 (“It is 
premature to determine whether a private prison will violate human rights 
disproportionately. Time will tell. The law should be put to the test before the court reaches 
any conclusions on this matter.”). 
25. See Wright, supra note 2; Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, 
and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 946 (2004) (responding to scholars 
who “suggest that private punishment, policing, and military corporations violate human rights 
more often than public punishment, policing, and military institutions. But this claim has been 
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of inmates’ rights, particularly the right to liberty and the right to human dignity.  
The Israeli Supreme Court starts from the stance that imprisonment is an 
outlier, that is, it is not a normal state of affairs.  The state is already in a tenuous 
position vis-à-vis an inmate’s rights by the very fact of imprisonment, an action 
that is a violation of a person’s personal liberty, although one that is justified.26  
This first premise of the Court’s argument has been overlooked in many of the 
case’s critiques, where the focus is on the inherent nature of privatization in a 
neutral and free market, where monies are regularly exchanged for services 
(equating, for example, the state-contractor relationship and the state-employee 
relationship).27  
Justice Beinisch, however, focuses on a different type of inherence—one where 
“we examine the extent of the violation of the right to personal liberty inherent in 
placing a person under lock and key.”28  The focus then is on imprisonment and the 
lived experience of the inmates and not the exchange of currency for services.  
According to Justice Beinisch, from this tenuous position regarding the right to 
liberty, any modification to the accepted form of imprisonment would risk tipping 
the scales to an abuse of inmates’ rights.29   
To understand how privatization undermines personal liberty we must ask 
what added risks to personal liberty are inherent in the privatized prison model, 
even when following the extensive regulations of the UK model, as adopted in 
Israel.  Despite protective regulations, prison employees must exercise discretion 
when they “are in control of the managing the lives of the inmates in the prison on 
a daily basis,”30 including “dealing with unexpected situations in the course of 
direct contact with the inmates and making quick decisions on an immediate basis, 
where the supervision and scrutiny of the making of the decisions and the manner 
 
vigorously and carefully contested, and there is very little empirical evidence to support it”).  
26. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10, 999 UNTS 171, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16 1966) (treating prisoners with dignity, with a 
focus on rehabilitation and not punishment); United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex 1, ESC Res. 663C, (XXIV) (1957), U.N. 
ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by ESC Res. 2076, (LXII) (1977), 
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), available at 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal _justice/UN_Standard_Minimum_Rules_for_the_ 
Treatment_of_Prisoners.pdf; Sara A. Rodriguez, The Impotence of Being Earnest: Status of the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in Europe and the United 
States, 33 CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 61 (2007) (arguing that the UN Standard Rules still 
maintain relevance for domestic development of standards for prisons). 
27. See, e.g., Volokh, Employee-Contractor Distinction, supra note 8. See also discussion, infra note 54 
and accompanying text. 
28. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 30, at 70. 
29. See id. ¶33, at 73. See also id. ¶ 39, at 78 (extending this argument in the human dignity context). 
30. Id. ¶ 31, at 71.  
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of exercising the discretion can only be carried out retrospectively.”31  Thus, 
decisions that go to the heart of personal liberty, a right that is already greatly at 
risk in the prison context, are made by those working for “a private corporation 
motivated by economic considerations of profit and loss.”32  Therefore, the risk to 
personal liberty “is inherently greater than the violation of the same right of an 
inmate when the entity responsible for his imprisonment is a government 
authority that is not motivated by those considerations.”33  However, this is a 
consequentialist argument that would require, and could be refuted by, empirical 
evidence.  
As such, Justice Beinisch instead argues that privatization constitutes a per se 
violation of the right to liberty.  This would be a violation “even if the term of 
imprisonment that these two inmates serve is identical and even if the violation of 
the human rights that actually takes place behind the walls of each of the two 
prisons where they serve their sentences is identical.”34  Her logic for a per se 
violation of the right to liberty rests on two principles.  First, that the right to 
liberty is already violated by imprisonment, and second, that punishment 
administered by a private prison has less legitimacy than punishment by a public 
entity.35  In a liberal state, according to Justice Beinisch, the state monopoly of the 
criminal justice system is fundamental to the social contract establishing the 
state,36 in particular the constitutional principles of Israel.  He asserts that “the 
subordination of the various security services to the elected government has 
always been one of the hallmarks of the State of Israel as a modern democratic 
state, and it is one of the basic constitutional principles underlying the system of 
government.”37  Thus, punishment removed from state authorities would reduce its 
democratic legitimacy and is also more likely to lead to abuses.     
The argument for a violation of personal dignity tracks the argument for 
personal liberty.   Section 2 of the Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 
states, “One may not harm the life, body or dignity of a person.”38  If the resulting 
 
31. Id. 
32. Id. ¶ 33, at 73. 
33. Id. 
34. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 33, at 73 (referring to a comparison between a prisoner in a public 
prison as opposed to a prisoner in a private prison).  See also Harel, supra note 8 (acknowledging 
that this is the central reasoning of the case (albeit, Harel is inclined towards Procaccia’s more 
pragmatic view of focusing on the reasoning of private bodies and their reliance on cost factors)). 
35. See Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 39, at 77-78. 
36. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 23, at 61-63. For an argument concerning the importance of the state 
monopoly power, see Richard Harding, State Monopoly of “Permitted Violation of human rights”: 
The Decision of the Supreme Court of Israel Prohibiting the Private Operation and Management of 
Prisons, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131 (2012). 
37. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 24, at 64.   
38. Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 2, § 2. 
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circumstances in the private and public domains do not differ, how can 
privatization be a violation of Section 2?  How can Justice Beinisch hold that one of 
two contexts that potentially provide the same treatment is more violative of 
personal dignity?   
Justice Beinisch’s argument begins with the premise that inmates may have 
lost their “liberty and freedom of movement, as well as additional rights[,] . . . but 
an inmate of a prison does not lose his constitutional right to human dignity.”39  
And yet, the prison context must be seen as inherently violating the right to 
personal dignity, although justifiably so.  However, the dignity of inmates in such a 
special situation is tenuous and must be recognized as such.  Quoting Justice 
Mazza, the dignity of an inmate holds a special place in and for society as a whole:  
Moreover, a violation of the human dignity of a prison inmate does 
not merely affect the inmate, but also the image of society.  
Humane treatment of prison inmates is a part of a humane-moral 
norm that a democratic society is required to uphold.  A state that 
violates the dignity of its prison inmates breaches the obligation 
that it has to all of its citizens and residents to respect basic 
human rights (referring to 4463/94 Golan v. Prisons Service 50(iv) 
PD 136 (1996)).40 
Again, this is not an abstract matter of an analogy with the contractor versus 
employee.  Instead, we are in a special context where the “basic human rights” 
guarantees of the state are already precarious—a context where the state is 
already prone to violate the right to personal dignity.  
With human dignity of inmates so crucial41 and yet so tenuous, “the question 
 
39. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 35, at 74. 
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
41. Judge Beinisch quotes the broad definition of human dignity from previous Israeli court 
decisions: 
Human dignity is based on the autonomy of the individual will, the freedom of choice and 
the freedom of action of a human being as a free agent. Human dignity relies on the 
recognition of the physical and spiritual integrity of a human being, his humanity, his 
worth as a human being, all of which irrespective of the degree of benefit that others derive 
from him.  
 Id. ¶ 34, at 74 (quoting Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset (unreported decision 
of May 11, 2006)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Note that human dignity under 
Israeli law is quite broad, with limitations being imposed when conflicting with the public 
interest, but otherwise serving as a key ground for protecting human rights. See Ariel L. Bendor 
& Michael Sachs, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Concept in Israel and Germany, 44 ISR. L. 
REV. 25 (2011); Doran Shultziner & Itai Rabinovic, Human Dignity, Self Worth, and Humiliation: 
A Comparative Legal-Psychological Approach, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 105 (2012) 
(explaining that human dignity generally focuses on protecting a person’s self worth and calling 
for a more objective standard of human dignity based on a legal-psychological understanding). See 
also HCJ 355/79 Katalan v. Prisoner Services 34(iii) PD 294 [1980] (Isr.) (holding that intrusive 
drug searches, such as enemas, violate the human dignity of prisoners returning from weekend 
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that we need to decide in this case is whether imprisoning a person in a privately 
managed prison causes a greater violation of his human dignity than imprisoning 
him in a public prison.”42  To answer this question Justice Beinisch returns to the 
meaning of human dignity—”no one denies that the right to dignity applies with 
regard to preventing the denigration of a person and preventing any violation of his 
human image and his worth as a human being.”43   
Needless to say, the imprisonment of a person, the very classification of someone 
as a criminal or an inmate, would per se constitute a “violation of his human 
image.”   Of course, countless sources discuss the deleterious real-world effects of 
branding a person as an inmate or a felon.44  However, this denigration would be 
considered justified in the same way that the violation of personal liberty through 
imprisonment is justified.  The question is whether this branding is any worse in a 
private prison?  And here, Justice Beinisch relies on the argument that 
privatization commodifies inmates—they are treated as a means to an end, the 
profits of a corporation:  
There is therefore an inherent and natural concern that 
imprisoning inmates in a privately managed prison that is run 
with a private economic purpose de facto turns the prisoners into a 
means whereby the corporation that manages and operates the 
prison makes a financial profit.  It should be noted that the very 
existence of a prison that operates on a profit-making basis reflects 
a lack of respect for the status of the inmates as human beings, and 
this violation of the human dignity of the inmates does not depend 
on the extent of the violation of human rights that actually occurs 
behind the prison walls (cf. in this respect the question of 
employing employees in a prison (HCJ 1163/98 Sadot v. Israel 
Prison Service [55(iv) PD 817 [200]] [21]).45 
Just as the loss of democratic legitimacy in privatized prisons is enough to move 
imprisonment from a justifiable deprivation of human liberty to a rights violation, 
 
leave). 
42. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 36, at 76. 
43. Id. ¶ 35, a 74. To understand the central role of human dignity and the symbolic significance of 
expressing disrespect, Beinisch quotes the legal philosopher Meir Dan-Cohen:  
Once an action-type has acquired a symbolic significance by virtue of the disrespect it 
typically displays, its tokens will possess that significance and communicate the same 
content even if the reason does not apply to them . . . As long as certain actions are 
generally considered to express disrespect, one cannot knowingly engage in them without 
offending against the target’s dignity, no matter what one’s motivations and intentions are. 
 Id. ¶ 38, at 77 (quoting MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND 
MORALITY 162 (2002))(internal quotations omitted). 
44. See, e.g., Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner 
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71 (2003).  
45. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 36, at 76 (emphasis added). 
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the branding of a prisoner as a commodity in private prisons is enough to shift a 
justifiable deprivation of dignity to a rights violation.  
However, Justice Beinisch’s arguments for per se violations are contextual in 
several important ways.  As noted previously, she begins from the special context 
of a prison and the special scrutiny that needs to be applied when fundamental 
human rights of vulnerable individuals are at stake.  In addition, the Israeli 
context is critical for finding violations of both the right to liberty and the right to 
dignity.  “The imprisonment of a person in a privately managed prison is contrary 
to the basic outlook of Israeli society . . . with regard to the responsibility of the 
state.”46  Justice Beinisch notes that such a decision might not apply in other 
jurisdictions with different views on state power and the privatization of prisons.  
For instance, “both in the United States and in Britain—unlike in Israel—there is 
a historical tradition of operating private prisons, which naturally is capable of 
influencing the manner in which the constitutionality of the privatization of 
prisons is regarded.”47  
C. Corporal Punishment as a Comparison 
Reinforcing this reading of the Prison Case opinion, Justice Beinisch in an 
earlier controversial ruling, used the same approach to ban corporal punishment in 
Israel.48  The Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals, was 
presented with a case of a mother hitting her children repeatedly over the course of 
several years.  In defense, the accused claimed that the hitting did not rise to the 
level of abuse, and that corporal punishment should be allowed for educational 
purposes.  Judge Beinisch noted that “we are dealing with cruel behaviour of the 
mother to her children and humiliating them, regarding them as property that she 
can do with what she wishes.”49  However, Justice Beinisch went further, agreeing 
with the trial judge that corporal punishment is a per se violation of human rights.  
While previous Israeli cases had given wide discretion to parents’ techniques for 
raising their children,50 Justice Beinisch examined the issue with an “emphasis on 
 
46. Id. ¶ 39, at 78. 
47. Id. ¶ 62, at 98-99. 
48. CrimA 4596/98 A. v. Israel, 54(i) PD 145 (2000) (Isr.), available at http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/ 
sites/default/files/upload/opinions/A.%20v.%20State%20of%20Israel.pdf [hereinafter Corporal 
Punishment Case]. The decision, which applied to corporal punishment within the family, was 
subsequently applied to such punishment in the school system as well. See, e.g., CA 1730/00 Anon. 
v. Israel 54(v) PD 433 [2000] (Isr.); CA 3362/02 Israel v. Abu Asbah 56(v) PD 6 [2002] (Isr.). 
49.  Corporal Punishment Case, supra note 48, ¶ 18, at 23. 
50. See Benjamin Shmueli, The Influence of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on Corporal 
Punishment – A Comparative Look, 10 OR. REV. OF INT’L L. 189, 222-23 (2008) (discussing the 
development of the case law in Israel).  
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the child’s right of dignity, bodily integrity and mental health,”51 drawing upon the 
right to dignity provisions of the Basic Law as well as Israel’s ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.52  From this framework, Justice Beinisch 
concluded:  
[I]t should be held that corporal punishment of children, or their 
humiliation and degradation by their parents as an educational 
method is totally improper, and it is a relic of a socio-educational 
outlook that is obsolete.  The child is not the property of his parent; 
it is forbidden that he should serve as a punching bag which the 
parent may hit at will, even when the parent believes in good faith 
that he is exercising his duty and right to educate his child.  The 
child is dependent upon his parent, needs his love, protection and 
gentle caress.  Inflicting punishment that causes pain and 
humiliation does not contribute to the character of the child and 
his education, but violates his rights as a human being.  It harms 
his body, his feelings, his dignity and his proper development.53  
This ruling mirrors the prison privatization decision, as it is grounded in a 
particular context of vulnerability (a child being dependent upon parents for love 
and protection), and the decision takes a broad view of human dignity, including 
the expressive harm that is inherent to corporal punishment, in that such 
punishment harms one’s body, feelings, dignity and proper development.  
II. Previous Analyses of the Israeli Supreme Court Decision 
While several commentaries have been written on the Israeli decision, two 
stand out and will highlight the broad significance and uniqueness of Justice 
Beinisch’s opinion.  The first, written by Alexander Volokh, embraces the 
prevailing law and economics position on privatization of public services,54 that in 
the abstract privatization is no different from any contractual obligations, 
including the state-employee relationship found in public services.  Therefore, 
privatization can never be a per se violation of human rights as it is just another 
 
51. Corporal Punishment Case, supra note 48, ¶22, at 29. 
52. See Shmueli, supra note 50, at 221-25 (asserting that Convention on the Rights of the Child 
served as a direct influence on the Supreme Court in holding that corporal punishment was a 
violation of a child’s basic right); Yehiel S. Kaplan, Corporal Punishment of Children in Israel: A 
New Trend in Secular and Religious Law, 14 INT’L. J. CHILD. RTS. 363 (2006) (asserting that 
Justice Beinisch’s decision hinged on three key aspects of Israeli law: the best interest’s of the 
child, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Basic Law: Human Dignity, and 
concluding that the decision is also in line with basic principles of Jewish Law). 
53. Corporal Punishment Case, supra note 48, ¶29, at 38. 
54. See Abdul Paliwala, Privatisation in Developing Countries: The Governance Issue, 2000 (1) L. 
SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. (LGD), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/ 
fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2000_1/paliwala/; see also Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and 
Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197 (2008). 
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form of the provision of public services.  The second commentary, by Barak 
Medina, is sympathetic to Justice Beinisch’s overall argument but misreads the 
Court’s commodification argument, claiming the Court has created a new right, the 
right to be free from privatized prisons.  Instead, we argue that the Court was not 
creating a new Constitutional right but was further elaborating on the meaning of 
the right to human dignity, specifically how the expressive meaning of labeling an 
inmate as a commodity infringes upon that right.  
A. Alexander Volokh and Veils of Ignorance 
Alexander Volokh, in a 2012 article,55 presents wide-ranging arguments against 
privatization as a per se violation of human rights that, if followed to their logical 
conclusion, could support the very expansive position that there can be no per se 
argument against privatization of any public service.  Volokh asserts that at the 
heart of the matter, and in the abstract, there is no distinction between employees 
of the government and contractors of the government.56  For Volokh, the key aspect 
of privatization is the relationship between the state and the contracted, 
irrespective of whether the contracted service is sanitation, highway construction, 
or the managing of people, such as inmates, who are subjected to a violation of 
personal liberty and dignity.  He writes:  
The state is an abstract set of relationships; therefore, to act, the 
state must use agents of some sort.  Both employees and private 
contractors are private individuals; both do things for the state in 
exchange for money; both have private purposes, as well as the 
discretion to follow those purposes sometimes, even contrary to the 
desires of the state.57  
At this level of abstraction, public employees and employees of private contractors 
are equivalent.  Thus, according to Volokh, any critiques of privatization cannot be 
made in the abstract, but must rely on the admittedly ambiguous empirical 
consequences of privatization.   
His is a convincing argument if we accept the level of abstraction that he insists 
upon and the playing field that he creates behind his “veil of ignorance.”  
Nonetheless, like any analytical game based on a veil of ignorance, the outcome is 
dictated by the level of abstraction we are willing to accept.  How many veils are 
we willing to cover ourselves with?  How ignorant will we pretend to be about 
reality?  If we are to agree that we are all born free and equal, then a veil of 
ignorance leading to a Rawlsian account of “justice as fairness” could logically 
 
55. Volokh, Employee-Contractor Distinction, supra note 8.  
56. Id. at 133. 
57. Id.; see also Feely, supra note 2, at 1418. 
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follow.  However, such an abstract position has no more validity than starting with 
the premise that we are all interdependent individuals and that many of us 
experience vulnerability.58  Moreover, if we are to change the rules of the game to 
include some significant facts—facts that are clearly a condition of any real-world 
circumstances—then the rules and outcomes will change.  And, this is the case 
with the Israeli decision and any discussion of privatization.    
First, we must make some assumptions about who is being acted upon.  In the 
criminal justice system, in the nursing home industry, in welfare programs, and in 
immigration detention and deportation systems, it is vulnerable people who are 
being acted upon.  Surely, the rich and powerful live lives influenced by 
privatization as well.  Their kids attend private schools, they golf at private golf 
courses, they even drive on private toll roads, and rely on private homeowners’ 
associations for a wealth of services.  However, the difference remains that they 
are rich and powerful with important social connections.  Thus, if the services they 
desire are not provided in a timely, satisfactory manner, they have the means to 
switch services or to endure the blow of having poorly manicured greens on their 
favorite course.  
Second, we are not living in an abstract world with abstract rules created 
behind a veil of ignorance.59  Treaties, constitutions, and courts around the globe 
have held that states have extra duties toward vulnerable individuals.60  These 
duties are not just found in international human rights law, but also in the 
domestic laws of almost all countries, including in Israel’s Basic Law.  To start off 
with a more abstract position than that would unnecessarily create an artificial 
state of affairs. 
Perhaps, the clearest signal that Volokh’s abstraction has gone too far is when 
he argues that there is no inherent distinction between private contractors and 
public employees because they both perform services for money; both groups seek 
to “earn a profit.”61  In fact, “we’re all seeking to earn a profit.”62  Volokh argues 
 
58. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 6 (2004) 
(“We do not begin our lives in equal circumstances. We begin in unequal ones.”). In such a society, 
Fineman argues, “the approach to a resolution to this type of inequality is not found in simplistic 
and hypothetical prescription or ideological placebos of independence, autonomy, and self-
sufficiency.” Id.  
59. See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109, 112 (1995) (offering a critique of Rawls’s approach 
and noting that account must be taken “of the fact that autonomous citizens respect the interests 
of others on the basis of just principles and not only from self-interest, that they can be obligated 
to loyalty, that they want to be convinced of the legitimacy of existing arrangements and policies 
through the public use of their reason, and so forth”).  
60. See generally ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A RE-ANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES (1985).  
61. Volokh, supra note 8, at 174. 
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that even the profit motives of shareholders are not inherently different from 
public prison guards or their supervisors.  While some prison guards might be 
more public-spirited than some shareholders, “investors might put their money 
into prison firms . . . because they really care about corrections.”63  Yes, that 
possibility exists, as does the possibility that shareholders will someday open 
prisons for purely philanthropic motives.  But the mere possibility of a counter-
example would water down almost all definitional distinctions (and would even 
approach Plato’s definitional criteria for the Forms as transcendent, eternal, and 
unchanging!).64  Further, in the shareholder example, courts—at least U.S. 
courts—have made it abundantly clear that corporations are by nature profit 
maximizing organizations.  For instance, in eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark,65 
the Delaware Supreme Court concluded:   
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the Craigslist directors 
are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany 
that form.  Those standards include acting to promote the value of 
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.  The “Inc.” after 
the company name has to mean at least that.  Thus, I cannot 
accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the [poison pill] 
Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and 
admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit 
Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .66    
Volokh quickly dismisses the arguments that corporations are inherently profit-
maximizing entities: “This strikes me as incorrect: firms don’t necessarily act to 
maximize profit, nor is profit-making any part of their essence.”67  At minimum, 
Volokh seems to be conflating individuals in an abstract state of nature with 
individuals who have already contracted for some good, in this case profit.   It 
 
62. Id. at 175 
63. Id. at 175-76. 
64. See generally CHARLES P. BIGGER, PARTICIPATION: A PLATONIC INQUIRY (1968). The discussion in 
Chapter 2 is particularly relevant.    
65. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010), available at 
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/de-supreme-court/1558886.html. The case involved the company eBay, 
which happened to be a minority shareholder in Craigslist, and eBay’s ability to start a company 
that directly competed with Craigslist, without eBay losing its shareholder rights in Craigslist as 
well. 
66. Id. at 34.  
67. Volokh, supra note 8, at 183. This assumption would be critical in undermining the Israeli Court 
decision, which held: 
[W]hen the power to deny the liberty of the individual is given to a private corporation, the 
legitimacy of the sanction of imprisonment is undermined, since the sanction is enforced by 
a party that is motivated first and foremost by economic considerations —considerations 
that are irrelevant to the realization of the purposes of the sentence, which are public 
purposes.  
 Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 29, at 69. 
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would seem safe to assume that private prison corporations are not created to 
provide a service in the best interest of vulnerable people.  Once we accept that 
corporations are inherently more likely to seek profits through a cost-benefit 
analysis, even when they are implementing public policies, we have to expect the 
corporation to be involved in social triage,68 where they will, within their 
discretion, take on clients that will offer more benefits (read: profits) for lower 
costs.69  Those most likely to be serviced by the private firm will not be the ones 
most in need of services, i.e., the most vulnerable.70  Of course, the emphasis on 
helping vulnerable people is often written into law specifically to counter policies 
that adopt a social triage approach that would leave out those most deserving of 
protection.  
So, the question is not whether there is an inherent wrong to privatization at its 
most abstract level, but whether there is an inherent wrong in privatization 
considering the fact that much of privatization disproportionately affects already 
vulnerable populations, especially where there is already a standard of special 
duties to such vulnerable individuals.  The key to the argument for private prisons 
then is the lived experience of inmates who are commodified when held by a 
private corporation.   
It must also be stressed that the argument of the Israeli Court is not the 
consequential argument as Volokh portrays it, that the cost-benefit analysis will 
lead to greater likelihood of damages to the inmates.  The concurrence in the 
Israeli case relied on the argument of the consequences of privatization on already 
vulnerable populations, but that argument is subject to empirical testing.71  
Instead, Justice Beinisch’s argument is that the inmates are denigrated by the 
very fact of privatization, by the very labeling as a commodity.72  
 
68. See William P. Simmons & Monica Casper, Culpability, Social Triage, and Structural Violence in 
the Aftermath of Katrina, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 675 (2012). 
69. This reasoning is most likely behind private prison companies refusing to place bids to purchase 
Arizona’s entire prison system in 2009 and 2010. See discussion infra note 122 and accompanying 
text. 
70. CHARLES DERBER, THE WILDING OF AMERICA: MONEY, MAYHEM, AND THE NEW AMERICAN DREAM 
127 (2006) (noting that social triage entails “‘a sorting on social grounds,’ which diverts the goods 
and services from those found to be most wanting”). 
71. Compare Justice Levy’s dissent in the Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 1, at 174 (noting that “the 
question of  [privatization’s] effect on basic human rights and other protected values, ought to be 
put to the test before we reach in this matter even those conclusions that the legal tools in our 
possession allow us to reach”), with Justice Beinisch’s majority opinion, id. ¶ 38, at 77-78 
(asserting that “a violation of human dignity may also be an ‘independent’ violation, when a 
certain act that is done or a certain institution that is created do not inherently violate other 
human rights, but they reflect an attitude of disrespect from a social viewpoint towards the 
individual”). 
72. See id. ¶ 38, at 77-78. 
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B. Barak Medina and the Commodification Argument  
By contrast, Barak Medina, ultimately agrees with Justice Beinisch’s 
conclusion, but argues that the decision would have more legitimacy if it were not 
grounded in human rights, but in a “constitutional norm prohibiting the 
privatization of ‘core’ governmental powers.”73  He reaches this conclusion by 
reading the Court’s decision as creating a new right to be free from punishment by 
private actors, “a right against privatization.”74  He writes:  
The Israeli Supreme Court’s decision . . . holds that an inmate also 
has an interest, which is classified as a human right, that the 
discretion what specific measures will be used against him or her 
(for instance, to maintain order in the prison) will be employed by 
organs of the state and not by private entities.75   
As argued above however, instead of creating a new right against privatization, 
it appears that the Court was fleshing out the already ensconced human right to 
dignity.   
Medina first distinguishes Justice Beinisch’s per se argument from the 
consequentialist arguments in two of the concurring opinions.  He then, at least in 
the early part of his paper, separates out how privatization works differently for 
the right to liberty and the right to dignity; he argues that the loss of democratic 
legitimacy in the privatization context leads to a violation of the right to liberty, 
while the right to dignity analysis relies on a symbolic argument about the 
meaning of privatization.  He correctly notes that while many scholars have 
previously discussed the symbolic meaning of privatization, their arguments are 
rarely fleshed out adequately, and they have been unable to tie them to a 
constitutional law analysis.  Medina notes that while the Israeli decision aims to 
create a bridge between cultural and ethical theories and constitutional law, the 
Court’s reasoning is not sufficiently founded because “even if one could establish 
some kind of such an essential symbolic message or ‘social meaning’ to 
punishment, it has not been established that a prison operated by a private 
corporation necessarily conveys the wrong message.”76     
To better understand the Court’s analysis of the symbolic meaning of privatized 
punishment, Medina lays out two possible analogies (elaborating on the inmates’ 
interests in each example), but it is striking that his examples are founded on the 
premise that the Court has created a new human right not to be incarcerated in a 
privatized prison. The first is a classic argument between consequentialists and 
 
73. Medina, supra note 8, at 691. 
74. Id.  
75. Id. at 707. 
76. Id. at 702-03. 
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deontologists on the role of intention in harm.77  While the consequentialist would 
only consider actual harm and disregard intentions, the deontologist sees a 
difference between intended harm and unintended harm.  The second example he 
lays out is the difference between being harmed by an action of the executive 
branch or by an action that has included legislative deliberation.78  Only in the 
first example does Medina find the intention to be part of the harm itself, while in 
the second example, the decision as to who authorized the act does not necessarily 
have a bearing on the harm suffered.79  For some victims it might be better if the 
authority came from the executive branch instead of a majority of the legislative 
branch or vice versa.80 
So, what of the prison privatization example? Medina concludes that the 
democratic legitimacy argument of privatization, which the Court uses for the 
right to liberty, is more like his first example.81  Medina then turns to the symbolic 
status of the inmate argument, which the Court did use to find a violation of the 
right to dignity.  Here, he agrees with the Court with one important caveat: 
An inmate has, at least as an objective matter, a substantial 
interest in being treated as a human being, not as a mere means 
for a private corporation to make a profit.  If it can be shown that 
prison privatization brings about such a (symbolic) outcome, it is 
indeed justified to classify it as an independent infringement of 
inmates’ basic liberties.82 
However, Medina does not agree with the Court’s assumption that 
“privatization brings about such a (symbolic) outcome,” at least not in all cases.  
First, he argues that the privatization of the prisoner plays a “relatively minor 
role” in constructing the social meaning of the prisoner and that it was not the 
profit-maximizing private prisoner who gave the inmate his status, but “public 
organs.”83 
Secondly, Medina asserts that there is no clear-cut distinction between private 
and public actors.84  For instance, even in the Israeli case the guards were 
 
77. Id. at 707. 
78. Id. at 708. 
79. Id.  
80. Medina, supra note 8, at 708-09. 
81. Id. However, he then incorrectly tries to read the Court’s decision as holding that the democratic 
legitimacy argument would also be pivotal for the right to dignity argument, and concludes, “It is 
accordingly questionable to assume that the execution of punishment by a private entity, which 
thus lacks, arguably, popular legitimacy, expresses some kind of disrespect toward the inmate.” 
Id. at 709. However, we must remember that the Court only tangentially relied on the popular 
legitimacy argument in finding a violation of the right to dignity.   
82. Id. (emphasis added).  
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 709-10.  
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classified as civil servants according to the law.  Thus, if privatization evinces 
disrespect, it is not clear whether we are dealing with public or private actors.  
Medina concludes, “I don’t think that we should view incidents of the use of force 
by a prison-guard against a prisoner as ‘actions [that] are generally considered to 
express disrespect’ just because the prison staff works for a corporation rather than 
the state.”85  The Court then, Medina argues, should not have made a per se 
constitutional argument against privatization of prisons based on the symbolic 
meaning of the punishment, as “such a conclusion is not inevitable.”86  
Medina’s two arguments against a per se violation miss the mark in a couple of 
respects.  First, Medina argues that “the social meaning of punishment” is 
determined by the legitimacy of the institutions that have issued the sentence and 
not by the entity running the prison.  This is probably true, but the Court was not 
looking at the social meaning of the punishment, but at the image of the inmate, 
an image that is already reduced by the imprisonment context.  For Justice 
Beinisch, the question is whether treating an inmate as a commodity worsens the 
“violation of his human image and his worth as a human being.”87  Medina’s 
second criticism tracks Volokh’s arguments discussed above, that there is no 
categorical distinction between a private employee and a public employee.  For 
Medina, this distinction exists on something of a continuum.  One counter to this 
proposition would be to question why any legislation would ever be labelled 
“privatization of prisons,” if such a concept has no meaning.  Of course it has 
meaning, specifically because private for-profit companies are for profit.  As such, 
the inmates are more likely to be treated as commodities.  In Justice Beinisch’s 
view, this additional dehumanization was enough to rule that privatization of 
prisons is a per se violation of the human right to dignity.  
While offering a generally sympathetic reading of Justice Beinisch’s decision, 
Medina misses the fundamental premise of the decision, namely, that inmates are 
already in a very tenuous position vis-à-vis the state, one that already jeopardizes 
their human dignity.  Justice Beinisch does not begin with the stigmatization of 
inmates as commodities, but with inmates stigmatized as inmates.  Thus, the 
question is not whether inmates in private prisons are stigmatized, but whether 
 
85. Medina, supra note 8, at 711. 
86. Id. 
87.  Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 35, at 74 (emphasis added). Human dignity under Israeli law is quite 
broad, with limitations being imposed when conflicting with the public interest, but otherwise 
serving as a key ground for protecting human rights. See Bendor & Sachs, supra note 41; 
Shultziner & Rabinovic, supra note 41 (explaining that human dignity generally focuses on 
protecting a person’s self worth and calling for a more objective standard of human dignity based 
on a legal-psychological understanding). See also Katalan v. Prisoner Services, supra note 41 
(holding that intrusive drug searches, such as enemas, violate the human dignity of prisoners 
returning from weekend leave). 
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they are stigmatized in an additional, unnecessary way by privatization.  The very 
fact that a profit-maximizing corporation is involved in the incarceration is enough 
to make the inmate a commodity, and thus infringes upon the right to dignity.  As 
Justice Beinisch writes, “the very existence of a prison that operates on a profit-
making basis reflects a lack of respect for the status of the inmates as human 
beings.”88  In short, Medina’s analysis underestimates the importance of branding 
in the prison context.   
III. Cauterization of Inmates 
Nonetheless, Medina is correct to argue that the commodification arguments are 
not fleshed out adequately, or as Rosky points out, “[o]ddly, critics rarely bother to 
explain the normative importance of commodification.”89  Thus, we need to explore 
this branding in more detail.  To do so, we first look at the recent use of the term 
“cauterization” in human rights scholarship to demonstrate how the branding 
process is inherent to most major human rights abuses, particularly when the 
mere labeling of a person tips the human rights scales.  We then briefly examine a 
recent mental health case from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights that used analogous logic, Purohit v. Gambia, to further clarify the ills of 
branding in the human rights context.  
The term “cauterize” aptly describes the comprehensive way that the “Other” 
has been excluded.  There are three identifiable aspects of cauterization that 
correspond to the term’s three original inter-related meanings.  The first meaning 
comes from its roots in the Greek verb kauteriazein, which means to burn with a 
kauter or a branding iron.90  Such branding was historically done to physically 
mark a slave or criminal as rightless, or someone as poor.91  Second, cauterization 
refers to a medical procedure in which burning is used to seal off or remove part of 
 
88. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 36, at 76. 
89. Rosky, supra note 25, at 965. Rosky is correct to note that:  
Commodification critics rarely trouble themselves to spell out normative conclusions and 
principles—to explain why the social meaning of punishment, policing, and military force 
is, or should be, important. . . .  
In lieu of such arguments, cultural critics normally proffer canned assumptions and 
assertions that exercises of punishment, policing, and military force “must” send public 
messages. 
 Id. at 965 n.316. Nonetheless, Rosky, in evaluating the commodification argument, does not 
address the way it is framed by Justice Beinisch.  
90. See HENRY G. LIDDELL ET AL., A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON (10th ed. 1968). 
91. See David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of “Jim Crow”: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis 
of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL, & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 133 (1994); William P. Quigley, 
Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834: Regulating the Working and 
Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73 (1996).  
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the body.  This procedure is most often used to stop bleeding, but it can also seal a 
wound to stop the spread of infection.92 Finally, in its most metaphorical meaning, 
cauterization means to deaden feelings or make one callous to the suffering of 
another.93  The “Other” is then branded as beneath humanity, below those who 
deserve rights.  Those deemed inferior (or “rightless”) are sealed off from the polis 
and its attendant form of protection (like a court), in effect treating the voice of the 
rightless as an infection that must be stopped from spreading.  Finally, those with 
rights, the full members of the polis, deaden their feelings toward the suffering of 
those who are branded as rightless.94   
Of course, this logic lurks behind almost every ideology that has supported 
genocide, colonization, or slavery.  Examples abound.  African slaves brought to the 
Americas were often physically branded on their faces or shoulders.95  Even after 
that practice was banned in much of the U.S., less physical, but very real, legal 
branding was perpetrated by legislation and legal opinions.  African Americans 
were famously branded as “so far inferior that they had no rights which the white 
man was bound to respect,” and therefore, they “might justly and lawfully be 
reduced to slavery for his benefit.”96  Once branded as rightless, as beneath rights, 
those marginalized would no longer be granted access to the courts and could not 
even testify in the courts in any state, as if their voices, their perspectives, literally 
did not exist.97  Of course, such branding and exclusion contributed in no small 
part to the brutality suffered at the hands of genteel slave owners and 
“courageous” captains of death boats, who were deadened to the immense suffering 
of the rightless.  As British seaman James Field Stanfield described one ship 
captain, “Because of his debility, he ordered anyone to be flogged tied to his 
bedpost so he could see the victims face-to-face, enjoying their agonizing screams, 
while their flesh was lacerated without mercy.”98  
It should be noted that the second and third prongs of cauterization are 
consequential arguments, but not the type that the Israeli Supreme Court 
 
92. See VICTOR ROBINSON, THE MODERN HOME PHYSICIAN: A NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL 
KNOWLEDGE (1939). 
93. Cauterize, v.,, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/29200 (last visited 
May 26, 2015).  
94. The notion of cauterization is analogous in many ways to the Roman notion of infamia, where a 
citizen was stripped of his reputation, then could not give testimony, and was generally below 
consideration as a citizen. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections 
on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1896 (1999). 
95. See Leonard J. Hoenig, The Branding of African American Slaves, 148(2) JAMA DERMATOLOGY 
271 (2012). 
96. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856). 
97. See Neil H. Cogan, “Standing” before the Constitution: Membership in the Community, 7(1) L. & 
HIST. REV. 1, 21 (1989). 
98. MARCUS REDIKER, THE SLAVE SHIP: A HUMAN HISTORY 149 (2007). 
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eschewed in its decisions.  Instead, they are theorized as consequences inherent to 
the branding process, not to the act that causes the branding, such as incarceration 
in a privatized prison.  
At least one regional human rights tribunal has found that the expressive harm 
caused by such branding is a violation of the human right to dignity.  The African 
Commission, in its pioneering case of Purohit v. Gambia, found that that The 
Gambia’s mental health legislation (the outdated Lunatics Detention Act) and its 
treatment of the mentally ill at its Campana psychiatric unit violated several 
provisions of the African Charter, such as Article 2 (equal protection), Article 5 
(human dignity), and Article 16 (the right to enjoy the best attainable state of 
physical and mental health).99  Among other things, the government was found to 
have cauterized the mentally ill in the manner described above.  The Commission 
was troubled by the manner in which the mentally ill were labeled or branded by 
Gambian law as “lunatics” and “idiots,” terms, “which without any doubt 
dehumanise and deny them any form of dignity.”100  Similar to the Israeli Supreme 
Court decision, this branding by itself was found to be a violation of Article 5 of the 
African Charter that guarantees “the right to the respect of dignity inherent in a 
human being.”101  Once branded as “lunatics,” the mentally ill were sealed off from 
the polis by internment at Campana, and the patients did not have a voice in the 
appeals process, as Gambian law contained no “provisions for the review or appeal 
against an order of detention or any remedy for detention made in error or wrong 
diagnosis or treatment.”102  Their voice was further cauterized in that all patients 
at Campana, regardless of the type and extent of their illness, were denied the 
right to vote in violation of Article 13 of the African Charter.103  The Gambia was 
ordered to repeal the Lunatic Detentions Act and to establish a panel to review 
previous detention decisions.104  It was also ordered to provide a voice to the 
mentally ill through representation in the form of legal aid so that patients could 
challenge their detention.105  
 
99. See Purohit v. Gambia, supra note 6, at 8.  
100. Id. ¶ 59. 
101.  Id. ¶¶ 56-59. 
102. Id. ¶¶ 27, 71. 
103. Id. ¶¶ 73-76. 
104.  Id. at 8. 
105. INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (IHRDA), LEGAL AID IN THE 
GAMBIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND PRACTICE 16 (2012), available at 
http://www.ihrda.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Legal-Aid-in-The-Gambia-layout-2012-website-
download.pdf. Such arguments closely resemble analyses of expressive harm. Consider Ahmed 
Haque’s discussion of segregation in the U.S.:  
The wrongfulness of racial segregation did not lie entirely in the gross material inequality 
of social conditions maintained for whites and for persons of color, but also in a pervasive 
message of racial hierarchy and white purity. To say that “separate . . . [is] inherently 
 Privatization of Prisons in Israel and Beyond 
509 
Sharon Dolovich’s recent impassioned work on the dehumanization of inmates 
tracks this cauterization logic, arguing that imprisonment, which brands the 
inmates as inferior, poses special risks for further violations of human dignity.  
Dolovich asserts that the mass incarceration of the past twenty years has been 
grounded in what she calls “the exclusionary project:” “People in prison are 
subhuman, and they are polluted and unclean.  They must therefore be kept away 
from society, lest they defile the rest of us.”106 
Similar to the Purohit case, attempts at redress are stymied by incarceration:  
[W]here a defined minority of the population is stripped of both 
civil liberties and, often, the right to vote; prisoners are therefore 
excluded from the bargaining necessary to prevent oppression, 
and, especially in a privatized context, the general public usually is 
excluded from regular information about the treatment of inmates 
at prisons.107  
Dolovich’s writings also concur with the Israeli Supreme Court decision, that 
the consequences of further degradation are exacerbated by the very notion of 
being placed in a prison, since: “Prisoners facing such conditions are not free just to 
walk away.  They instead must remain locked inside the site of their abuse, often 
in close proximity to their abuser, in what can only be a permanently traumatized 
and terrorized state bereft of any peace of mind.108  
Thus, prison privatization is a per se violation of prisoner’s dignity through the 
commodification process, with the attendant branding process maintaining 
empirical effects as well.109   
 
unequal” is in part to say that when segregation expresses negative evaluations of one 
group this is itself wrongful wrongful.  
 Adil Ahmad Haque, The Harmless Thoughts of Meir Dan-Cohen 6 (Dec. 10, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=650463 (footnotes 
omitted).  
106. SHARON DOLOVICH, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY 115 (Charles J. 
Ogletree et al. eds., 2012). 
107. Alfred Aman, Privatisation, Prisons, Democracy and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the 
Province of Administrative Law, in PRIVATISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALISATION 91, 110 (Koen Feyte & Felipe Gomez Isa eds., 2005).   
108. DOLOVICH, supra note 106, at 108. 
109. Unfortunately, Rosky’s extended essay on privatization of force explicitly cauterizes the views of 
the inmates in the discussion of commodification. He notes that the commodification critique of 
privatization: 
Often . . . focuses on inmates, suspects, and combatants. But I do not take this argument 
very seriously.  Clearly, we can aspire to communicate certain public messages to inmates, 
suspects, and combatants, but we cannot seriously concern ourselves over whether these 
messages actually get across to these victims. Our actions will always speak louder than 
our words, and our violent actions will always speak loudest of all.  
 Rosky, supra note 25, at 964 n.311. 
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IV. The Fundamental Elements of a Per Se Violation of the Human 
Rights to Dignity 
Could similar violations of the human right to dignity be found in other 
jurisdictions?110  From the discussions of the Israeli case and cauterization above, 
there seem to emerge three fundamental elements necessary for a court to find a 
per se violation of human dignity.  First, the case would need to involve vulnerable 
individuals, and the relevant jurisdiction would need to have special protections for 
vulnerable populations, such as inmates.  As Justice Arbel states in concurrence in 
the Israeli case, privatization “abandons the prison inmate, who is already at the 
bottom of the social ladder and in a sensitive and vulnerable situation, to his 
fate.”111  Similarly, in Purohit, the African Commission had to reiterate that: 
[M]entally disabled persons . . . have a right to enjoy a decent life, 
as normal and full as possible, a right which lies at the heart of the 
right to human dignity. This right should be zealously guarded 
and forcefully protected by all States party to the African 
Charter.112  
Second, there needs to be a special emphasis on the human right to dignity.  As 
Justice Beinisch writes of the Israeli context, “the right to human dignity became a 
super-legislative constitutional right that every government authority is liable to 
respect.”113  The African Commission in Purohit also highlighted the special place 
of human dignity as “an inherent right which every human being is obliged to 
respect by all means possible and on the other hand it confers a duty on every 
 
110. The question was considered by the Israel Supreme Court in its decision 
It should also be noted that we have not found any consideration by the courts 
in Britain, South Africa and the European Union, as well as by the European Court of 
Human Rights, of the question of the constitutionality of the privatization of prisons. From 
the opinion of Prof. J. Jowell that was filed by the state, it would appear that hitherto no 
claims have been raised before the aforesaid courts with regard to the constitutionality of 
the privatization of prisons. Prof. Jowell’s opinion is that were arguments of this kind to be 
raised before those courts, they would not be expected to be successful, inter alia because of 
the economic character of the issue and the lack of a ground of incompatibility with the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 60, at 98 (emphasis added). Jowell’s opinion was submitted by 
the state in support of prison privatization. 
111. Id. ¶ 4, at 106 (Arbel J., concurring). 
112. Purohit v. Gambia, supra note 6, ¶ 61.  
113. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 35, at 75. Similarly, Justice Arbel wrote in concurrence, “The value of 
human dignity on which I will focus, which for a decade and a half has enjoyed a special status of 
a super-legislative constitutional right in our legal system, recognizes the worth of human beings 
and regards them as an end in themselves. . . .” Id. ¶ 3, at 107-08. For a thorough overview of the 
meaning of the right to dignity in a variety of jurisdictions, see generally Christopher McCrudden, 
Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19(4) EUR. J. INT’L. L. 655 (2008). 
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human being to respect this right.”114  
Finally, there needs to be a sense that the action of the government, such as 
prison privatization or labeling of the mentally ill as “lunatics” or “idiots,” serves as 
a direct assault on the vulnerable populations’ dignity even in a symbolic way, 
such as an expression of disrespect.  Justice Beinisch approvingly quotes the 
following from Meir Dan-Cohen: “As long as certain actions are generally 
considered to express disrespect, one cannot knowingly engage in them without 
offending against the target’s dignity, no matter what one’s motivations and 
intentions are.”115  Thus, the privatization of prisons in Israel, “both in practice and 
on an ethical and symbolic level [] expresses a divestment of a significant part of 
the state’s responsibility for the fate of the inmates.”116   
The three key elements also are found in cases before the South African 
Constitutional Court, as it has stressed the human right to dignity, the rights of 
vulnerable populations, and the importance of symbolic dehumanization through 
commodification.117  Most interestingly, the South African Constitutional Court 
has directly tied commodification to the right to dignity in the prison context.  In S. 
V. Dodo, the South African Supreme Court, upon considering life sentences that 
were primarily intended to serve as a deterrence to others but did not fit the 
individuals’ crimes, held that:  
Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be 
attached; they are creatures with inherent and infinite worth; they 
ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means 
to an end.  Where the length of a sentence, which has been 
imposed because of its general deterrent effect on others, bears no 
relation to the gravity of the offence . . . the offender is being used 
essentially as a means to another end and the offender’s dignity 
assailed.118 
Just like in Israel, there is little history of privatization in South Africa, with 
 
114. Purohit v. Gambia, supra note 6, ¶ 57. 
115. Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 38, at 77 (quoting DAN-COHEN, supra note 43, at 162) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
116. Id. ¶ 39, at 78. 
117. Dawood & Another v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others, CCT35/99, ¶ 35, (8) BCLR 837 (CC) 
(2000) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.elaw.org/node/5200 (stating that “dignity is not only a 
value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be 
respected and protected”). See also, State v. Makwanyane & Another, CCT3/94, ¶ 144, (6) 
BCLR 665 (1995) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.html 
(involving the death penalty) (“The rights to life and dignity were the most important of all 
human rights, and the source of all other personal rights . . . .  By committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two rights 
above all others.”). 
118. State v. Dodo, CCT 1/01, ¶ 38, (5) BCLR 423 (CC) (2001) (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2001/16.html. 
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the first private prison, Maugang Maximum Security Prison, the second largest 
prison in the world, opening in 2000 and coming under intense scrutiny in the past 
year.119  Furthermore, in October 2013, the South African government announced 
that it will take over the management of a maximum security prison run 
by G4S after the private security contractor “lost effective control of the facility.”120   
Justice Beinisch conjectured that privatization would not hold the same 
symbolic meaning in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., where privatization 
has such a long history.  Indeed, in one of the few cases in the U.S. to challenge 
privatization as a per se violation, Judge Posner dismissed the claims on 
Thirteenth Amendment grounds and warned that to re-file such a case on other 
constitutional grounds would be “foolish,” noting: 
They will merely waste their money and earn a strike.  The claims 
are thoroughly frivolous.  The Thirteenth Amendment, which 
forbids involuntary servitude, has an express exception for persons 
imprisoned pursuant to conviction for crime.  Nor are we pointed to 
or can think of any other provision of the Constitution that might 
be violated by the decision of a state to confine a convicted prisoner 
in a prison owned by a private firm rather than by a 
government.121  
Although conditions in privatized U.S. prisons are currently being challenged in 
a number of suits throughout the country,122 a per se claim might not be justiciable 
 
119. See Ruth Hopkins, Privatisation of Prisons Has ‘Failed,’ MAIL & GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2013), 
available at http://witsjusticeproject.com/2013/11/08/privatisation-of-prisons-has-failed/ 
(“Correctional Services Minister Sbu Ndebele told Parliament on Tuesday that the 
privatisation of prisons in South Africa has failed. Mangaung prison, which was being run by 
global security firm G4S, was not delivering the required results . . . .”). 
120. Ruth Hopkins, South Africa Takes Over G4S Prison After Concerns, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2013, 
15:16 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/g4s-sacked-south-africa-prison-
mangaung. 
121. Pischke v. E Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). 
122. NGOs and private individuals have brought several high-profile lawsuits charging that the effects 
of the privatization of prisons and detention facilities are violations of fundamental civil rights. 
See Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 2014) (class action challenge by private prison 
inmates concerning health care practices and isolation units; the appellate court upholding the 
injunction and declaratory judgment of the district court); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Brewer, 
No. CV 2011-017119 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 2011), available at 
https://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files 
/documents/private_prison_Arizona_Injuction_Decision_102711.pdf (dismissing the case due to 
plaintiffs’ lack of standing). Significantly, courts have held that worsened conditions traced to 
prison privatization constitute a violation of basic human rights. See, e.g., Depriest v. Epps, No. 
3:10-cv-00663-CWR-FKB, Order Approving Settlement, at 4-6 (S.D. Miss. 2012), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/order.pdf (finding severe violations at private youth prison 
facility, including sexual and physical abuse). Further, many NGOs have extensively documented 
the abuses that seem endemic to private prisons and detention facilities. See, e.g., AMERICAN 
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, PRISON PRIVATIZATION IN ARIZONA 11-12 (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AZ_Prison_Privatization_White_Pa
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in U.S. Courts but arguably could succeed in the Inter-American Human Rights 
system.  Indeed, the Inter-American system is an especially fruitful jurisdiction for 
applying the logic of the Israeli Supreme Court decision.  The human right to 
dignity plays a significant role in the Inter-American system,123 and this clearly 
applies to those incarcerated under Article 5 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, which state that “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”124   
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that the human right to 
dignity is especially tenuous in a detention setting and that “the State has an 
ineluctable obligation to provide those persons with the minimum conditions 
befitting their dignity as human beings, for as long as they are interned in a 
detention facility.”125  The Court even expanded the dignity standard for prisoners 
to what we call a proyecto de la vida standard, calling on the state to not only 
 
per.pdf; AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, PRIVATE PRISONS: THE PUBLIC’S PROBLEM—A 
QUALITY ASSESSMENT OF ARIZONA’S PRIVATE PRISONS 40-47 (Feb. 2012), available at 
afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSC_Arizona_Prison_Report.pdf; AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE—PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 24-
27 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf; 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN THEIR OWN WORDS—ENDURING ABUSE IN ARIZONA 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS (June 2011), available at 
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/documents/ detention report 2011.pdf. Even the state of Colorado 
has found similar problems. See generally Colorado State Auditor, Rep. of the State Auditor, 
Private Prisons, Department of Corrections Performance Audit (Apr. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.ccjrc.org/pdf/DOC_Audit_04-2005.pdf (noting inadequate medical services, 
accountability issues between the facility and the state, faulty hiring practices, and non-
compliance with agreed-to facility standards). See also United Nations Human Rights Comm., 
Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of the United States of America, at 8, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/UN-ICCPR-Concluding-Observations-USA.pdf (recommending that 
“[t]he State party should monitor the conditions of detention in prisons, including private 
detention facilities, with a view to ensuring that persons deprived of their liberty be treated in 
accordance with the requirements of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant and the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners”). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected a 
federal cause of action against a privately-operated prison involving inadequate medical services 
to inmates, holding that the case should be submitted to a state court under state tort law rather 
than to a federal court. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617, 620 (2012).  
123. See generally Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of 
Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2008).  
124. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_ Human_Rights.pdf. 
125. Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Int-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 159  (Sept. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ articulos/seriec_112_ing.pdf. See also Minors in Detention v. 
Honduras, Merits, Int-Am. Comm’n H.R. No. 11.491, Rep. No. 41/99 (Mar. 10, 1999), 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc 14 rev. 573 (1998), available at www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/ 
Merits/Honduras 11491.htm. 
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ensure the right to dignity, but also to provide inmates with the opportunity to 
build their proyecto de la vida by holding that “the Court must establish whether 
the State, in fulfillment of its role of guarantor, took measures to ensure to all 
inmates at the Center—adults and children alike—the right to live with dignity 
and thus help them build their life plan, even while incarcerated.”126  The Inter-
American system has been quite sensitive to vulnerable persons in prison, ruling 
that they are entitled to special protection and oversight,127 and holding that the 
state maintains an affirmative duty to protect the many facets of an inmate’s 
human dignity, including “protecting him from possible circumstances that could 
imperil his life, health and personal integrity, among other rights.”128   
Similarly, in a mental disabilities case, the Inter-American Court plainly stated, 
“any person who is in a vulnerable condition is entitled to special protection, which 
must be provided by the States if they are to comply with their general duties to 
respect and guarantee human rights.”129  
V. Conclusion 
We find ourselves in an age where prisoners’ “very bodies now represent 
profits.”130  Indeed, private prison companies can warn shareholders that reduced 
incarceration levels could hurt the bottom line by saying that “[t]he demand for our 
facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement 
efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or 
through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by 
criminal laws.”131  In light of this reality, it is imperative to look at the real world 
consequences of privatized prisons.  The rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court and 
the African Commission in Purohit took seriously the pre-existing vulnerability of 
the inmates and patients, as well as the consequences of further cauterization.  
These decisions stand in sharp contrast to legal scholars whose arguments abstract 
from the real world. 
It may be possible that private prisons could enhance the dignity of prisoners by 
 
126. Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, supra note 125, ¶164.  
127. Persons Deprived of Freedom at Urso Branco Prison, Rondonia v. Brazil, Int-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
No. 394-02, Rep. No. 81/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, ¶ 6 (2006), available at 
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128. Minors in Detention v. Honduras, supra note 125, ¶ 135. 
129. Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Judgment, Int-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 12.237, Rep. No. 38/02, Doc. 5 rev. 1 
at 174, ¶ 103 (July 4, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos 
/seriec_149_ing/pdf (involving treatment of mental health patients in both public and private 
facilities).    
130. Cassandra Shaylor, “It’s Like Living in a Black Hole”: Women of Color and Solitary Confinement 
in the Prison Industrial Complex, NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT, 385, 409 (1998). 
131. MASON, supra note 2, at 12 (footnote omitted). 
 Privatization of Prisons in Israel and Beyond 
515 
improving prison conditions,132 but in many contexts that seems like a fantasy.  If 
improving the dignity of prisoners is the goal, and incarceration is inherently 
degrading, then turning to a for-private corporation seems troubling.  Humanizing 
prisoners does not require privatization, it requires a changed mindset about 
prisoners and concrete actions that reduce violence, improve rehabilitation efforts, 
and lower incarceration rates.  It calls for the reversal of the cauterization process. 
As Dolovich writes,  
Consider what would have to change if prisoners were widely 
understood to be fellow human beings and fellow citizens: Prison 
conditions would necessarily be humane and the opportunities for 
human development meaningful, notwithstanding the (temporary) 
deprivation of freedom.  Parole applications would be seriously 
scrutinized, and, perhaps after some period of confinement 
proportionate to the crime, those individuals found to pose no 
future public safety risk would be released.  And once released, 
people with felony convictions would not be burdened with 
gratuitous civil disabilities and might even be assisted by the state 
with the enterprise of reentry.133 
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